After MacIntyre: Kierkegaard, Kant, and classical virtue
In his influential book After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre identifies Kierkegaard's view of ethics with that of Kant. Both Kant and Kierkegaard, according to MacIntyre, accept the modern paradigm of moral activity for which freedom of the will is the ultimate basis. Ronald M. Green, in Kierkegaar...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Imprimé Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
[2014]
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| Dans: |
Journal of religious ethics
Année: 2014, Volume: 42, Numéro: 2, Pages: 310-333 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Kierkegaard, Søren 1813-1855
/ MacIntyre, Alasdair C. 1929-2025, After virtue
/ Kantisme
/ Éthique
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion NCA Éthique NCB Éthique individuelle VA Philosophie |
| Résumé: | In his influential book After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre identifies Kierkegaard's view of ethics with that of Kant. Both Kant and Kierkegaard, according to MacIntyre, accept the modern paradigm of moral activity for which freedom of the will is the ultimate basis. Ronald M. Green, in Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt, accepts and deepens this alignment between the two thinkers. Green argues that Kierkegaard deliberately obscured his debt to Kant by a systematic “misattribution” of his ideas to other thinkers, and to classical philosophy in particular. This essay argues that MacIntyre and Green are mistaken in identifying Kierkegaard with the Kantian tradition of moral autonomy and that they overlook his debt to the classical conception of virtue. In casting Kierkegaard in the role of the quintessential exponent of a modern conception of freedom, they have perhaps overlooked one of the greatest critics of moral autonomy who has ever lived. |
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| ISSN: | 0384-9694 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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