On the Basis of Moral Equality: a Rejection of the Relation-First Approach

The principle of moral equality is one of the cornerstones of any liberal theory of justice. It is usually assumed that persons' equal moral status should be grounded in the equal possession of a status-conferring property. Call this the property-first approach to the basis of moral equality. T...

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Published in:Ethical theory and moral practice
Main Author: Floris, Giacomo (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2019]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
RelBib Classification:NBE Anthropology
NCC Social ethics
NCD Political ethics
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B Rights
B Relational normativity
B Moral Status
B moral equality
B Sangiovanni
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520 |a The principle of moral equality is one of the cornerstones of any liberal theory of justice. It is usually assumed that persons' equal moral status should be grounded in the equal possession of a status-conferring property. Call this the property-first approach to the basis of moral equality. This approach, however, faces some well-known difficulties: in particular, it is difficult to see how the possession of a scalar property can account for persons' equal moral status. A plausible way of circumventing such difficulties is to explore another avenue for the justification of persons' equal moral status: moral equality should be grounded in the wrongness of treating others as inferiors. Call this the relation-first approach to the basis of moral equality. This paper aims at providing some reasons as to why this approach should be rejected and clarifying why the property-first approach still represents the most promising way of justifying our commitment to moral equality. Two objections will be pressed against the relation-first approach: first, grounding moral equality in the wrongness of treating others as inferiors gives rise to some disturbing normative implications; second, relation-first accounts cannot vindicate the idea that a range of beings has equal fundamental rights. This, however, is precisely what an account of moral equality is meant to justify. The paper, then, concludes that the relation-first approach fails to provide a plausible answer to the question of the basis of moral equality. Property-first accounts, whatever problems they encounter, are still more viable in principle. 
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