Incarnation, Divine Timelessness, and Modality

A central part of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation is that the Son of God ‘becomes' incarnate. Furthermore, according to classical theism, God is timeless: He exists ‘outside' of time, and His life has no temporal stages. A consequence of this ‘atemporalist' view is that a ti...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:  
Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Paul, Emily (VerfasserIn)
Beteiligte: Collier, Matthew James (VerfasserIn des Bezugswerks)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Lade...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Veröffentlicht: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Université Catholique de Louvain [2019]
In: TheoLogica
Jahr: 2019, Band: 3, Heft: 1, Seiten: 88-112
RelBib Classification:NBC Gotteslehre
NBF Christologie
VA Philosophie
weitere Schlagwörter:B Incarnation
B Divine Freedom
B Atemporality
B Son of God
B Modality
Online Zugang: Volltext (doi)
Volltext (kostenfrei)
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:A central part of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation is that the Son of God ‘becomes' incarnate. Furthermore, according to classical theism, God is timeless: He exists ‘outside' of time, and His life has no temporal stages. A consequence of this ‘atemporalist' view is that a timeless being cannot undergo intrinsic change—for this requires the being to be one way at one time, and a different way at a later time. How, then, can we understand the central Christian claim that the Son of God ‘becomes' human? This paper examines one such explanation, drawn from a brief remark by Brian Leftow: the Word takes on flesh by exhibiting modal variation with regards to the incarnation. On this account, a timeless God ‘becomes' incarnate simply due to variation across logical space: at some possible worlds He is incarnate and at others He is not. Modal variation need not, therefore, require temporality: it only requires variation across (static) possible worlds. I draw out the problems with Leftow's modal claim under the heads of Ersatzism and Genuine Modal Realism about possible worlds, respectively. I argue that in both instances, Leftow's desired cross-worldly variation of the Son's incarnation cannot be achieved.
ISSN:2593-0265
Bezug:Kritik in "On Emily Paul on Brian Leftow (2019)"
Enthält:Enthalten in: TheoLogica
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.14428/thl.v2i3.2283