The X-claim argument against religious belief offers nothing new
Stephen Law has recently offered an argument against the rationality of certain religious beliefs that he calls the X-claim argument against religious beliefs (Law in Relig Stud, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412526000330). The argument purports to show that it is irrational to believe in the e...
| Publié dans: | International journal for philosophy of religion |
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| Auteurs: | ; |
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2018]
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| Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Unreliable sources
B Religious Diversity B X-claim B Religious Belief B Defeat |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Résumé: | Stephen Law has recently offered an argument against the rationality of certain religious beliefs that he calls the X-claim argument against religious beliefs (Law in Relig Stud, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412526000330). The argument purports to show that it is irrational to believe in the existence of extraordinary beings associated with religions. However, the X-claim argument is beset by certain ambiguities that, once resolved, leave the argument undifferentiated from two other common objections to the rationality of religious belief: the objection from religious diversity and the objection from unreliable sources. And though the latter pose serious obstacles to the rationality of religious belief, the X-claim argument adds no further difficulty. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-018-9658-1 |