God is not a person (an argument via pantheism)
This paper transforms a development of an argument against pantheism into an objection to the usual account of God within contemporary analytic philosophy ('Swinburnian theism'). A standard criticism of pantheism has it that pantheists cannot offer a satisfactory account of God as personal...
| Veröffentlicht in: | International journal for philosophy of religion |
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| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2019]
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Jahr: 2019, Band: 85, Heft: 3, Seiten: 281-296 |
| normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Swinburne, Richard 1934-
/ Theismus
/ Gott
/ Person
/ Pantheismus
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus NBC Gotteslehre |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Divine personhood
B Pantheism B Divine language B Apophaticism |
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Vermutlich kostenfreier Zugang Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper transforms a development of an argument against pantheism into an objection to the usual account of God within contemporary analytic philosophy ('Swinburnian theism'). A standard criticism of pantheism has it that pantheists cannot offer a satisfactory account of God as personal. My paper will develop this criticism along two lines: first, that personhood requires contentful mental states, which in turn necessitate the membership of a linguistic community, and second that personhood requires limitation within a wider context constitutive of the 'setting' of the agent's life. Pantheism can, I argue, satisfy neither criterion of personhood. At this point the tables are turned on the Swinburnian theist. If the pantheist cannot defend herself against the personhood-based attacks, neither can the Swinburnian, and for instructively parallel reasons: for neither doctrine is God in the material world; in the pantheist case God is identical with the world, in the Swinburnian case God transcends it. Either way both the pantheist and the Swinburnian are left with a dilemma: abandon divine personhood or modify the doctrine of God so as to block the move to personhood. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-018-9678-x |