The incoherence of divine possibility constructivism
Before God created did God have ideas in mind for particular things, kinds of things, properties of things, particular events, and laws of nature? At least since Augustine, theists have proposed differing answers. This paper is about a relatively recent theory, which holds that God constructs them w...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
[2019]
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2019, Volume: 85, Issue: 3, Pages: 347-361 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
God
/ Creation
/ Constructivism (Philosophy)
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RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God NBD Doctrine of Creation |
Further subjects: | B
Brian Leftow
B Hugh McCann B Divine Ideas B Origin of possibility B James Ross |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
Summary: | Before God created did God have ideas in mind for particular things, kinds of things, properties of things, particular events, and laws of nature? At least since Augustine, theists have proposed differing answers. This paper is about a relatively recent theory, which holds that God constructs them when he creates the universe. James Ross, Brian Leftow, and Hugh McCann are its primary advocates. Since the shared features of their views do not pertain to the so-called "abstract objects" or to the "necessary truths" of mathematics and logic, let us call this "divine possibility constructivism" (DPC), differentiating it from the theistic activism of Christopher Menzel and Thomas Morris and from the voluntarism of René Descartes-both of which could otherwise be construed as "constructivist". According to Ross, Leftow, and McCann, God had nothing in mind before he created-which is to say that, before God created, God was not aware of possibilities for a universe. Rather, God's being aware of any such possibilities is grounded only in God's having constructed them ex nihilo. This paper shows that DPC is incoherent. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-018-9682-1 |