Foreknowledge Without Determinism
A number of philosophers and theologians have argued that if God has knowledge of future human actions then human agents cannot be free. This argument rests on the assumption that, since God is essentially omniscient, God cannot be wrong about what human agents will do. It is this assumption that I...
| Publié dans: | Sophia |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Netherlands
[2019]
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| Dans: |
Sophia
Année: 2019, Volume: 58, Numéro: 2, Pages: 103-113 |
| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion FA Théologie NBC Dieu NBE Anthropologie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Free Will
B Fatalism B Divine Foreknowledge B Divine Attributes |
| Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Résumé: | A number of philosophers and theologians have argued that if God has knowledge of future human actions then human agents cannot be free. This argument rests on the assumption that, since God is essentially omniscient, God cannot be wrong about what human agents will do. It is this assumption that I challenge in this paper. My aim is to develop an interpretation of God's essential omniscience according to which God can be wrong even though God never is wrong. If this interpretation of essential omniscience is coherent, as I claim it is, then there is a logically consistent position according to which God is essentially omniscient, God foreknows what human agents will do, and yet it is possible for human agents to do otherwise. Thus, the argument for theological fatalism fails. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-017-0623-8 |