Hinge Epistemology, Radical Skepticism, and Domain Specific Skepticism

This paper explores how hinge epistemology (specifically, Duncan Pritchard's brand of hinge epistemology) might fruitfully be applied not only to the problem of radical skepticism, but also to certain domain specific (or ‘local') skepticisms, and in particular, moral skepticism. The paper...

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Veröffentlicht in:International journal for the study of skepticism
1. VerfasserIn: Johnson, Drew (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Brill [2019]
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen):B Pritchard, Duncan 1974-, Epistemic angst / Epistemische Logik / Skeptizismus
RelBib Classification:AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus
VA Philosophie
weitere Schlagwörter:B hinge epistemology
B Duncan Pritchard
B moral skepticism
B local skepticism
B radical skepticism
B moral epistemology
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Zusammenfassung:This paper explores how hinge epistemology (specifically, Duncan Pritchard's brand of hinge epistemology) might fruitfully be applied not only to the problem of radical skepticism, but also to certain domain specific (or ‘local') skepticisms, and in particular, moral skepticism. The paper explains the idea of a domain specific skepticism, and how domain specific skepticisms contrast with radical skepticism. I argue that a domain specific skeptical problem can be resolved in just the same way as radical skepticism, if there are hinge commitments within that domain. I then suggest that there are hinge commitments in the moral domain, and use this to address a moral skeptical problem due to our apparent inability to know moral nihilism to be false.
ISSN:2210-5700
Enthält:Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191302