Hinge Propositions, Skeptical Dogmatism, and External World Disjunctivism
Following Wittgenstein's lead, Crispin Wright and others have argued that hinge propositions are immune from skeptical doubt. In particular, the entitlement strategy, as we shall refer to it, says that hinge propositions have a special type of justification (entitlement justification) because o...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
[2019]
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2019, Volume: 9, Issue: 2, Pages: 134-167 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Wright, Crispin 1942-
/ Proposition
/ Scepticism
/ Perception
/ Deception
|
| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
hinge proposition
B External World B skeptical dogmatism B Skepticism B Underdetermination B Crispin Wright |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | Following Wittgenstein's lead, Crispin Wright and others have argued that hinge propositions are immune from skeptical doubt. In particular, the entitlement strategy, as we shall refer to it, says that hinge propositions have a special type of justification (entitlement justification) because of their role in our cognitive lives. Two major criticisms are raised here against the entitlement strategy when used in attempts to justify belief in the external world. First, the hinge strategy is not sufficient to thwart underdetermination skepticism, since underdetermination considerations lead to a much stronger form of skepticism than is commonly realized. Second, the claim that hinge propositions are necessary to trust perception is false. There is an alternative to endorsing a particular hinge proposition about the external world, external world disjunctivism, which permits us to trust perception (to a point), while skirting the difficulties raised by skepticism. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191318 |