Hinge Propositions, Skeptical Dogmatism, and External World Disjunctivism

Following Wittgenstein's lead, Crispin Wright and others have argued that hinge propositions are immune from skeptical doubt. In particular, the entitlement strategy, as we shall refer to it, says that hinge propositions have a special type of justification (entitlement justification) because o...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Walker, Mark 1963- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill [2019]
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2019, Volume: 9, Issue: 2, Pages: 134-167
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Wright, Crispin 1942- / Proposition / Scepticism / Perception / Deception
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B hinge proposition
B External World
B skeptical dogmatism
B Skepticism
B Underdetermination
B Crispin Wright
Online Access: Volltext (Resolving-System)
Volltext (doi)
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Summary:Following Wittgenstein's lead, Crispin Wright and others have argued that hinge propositions are immune from skeptical doubt. In particular, the entitlement strategy, as we shall refer to it, says that hinge propositions have a special type of justification (entitlement justification) because of their role in our cognitive lives. Two major criticisms are raised here against the entitlement strategy when used in attempts to justify belief in the external world. First, the hinge strategy is not sufficient to thwart underdetermination skepticism, since underdetermination considerations lead to a much stronger form of skepticism than is commonly realized. Second, the claim that hinge propositions are necessary to trust perception is false. There is an alternative to endorsing a particular hinge proposition about the external world, external world disjunctivism, which permits us to trust perception (to a point), while skirting the difficulties raised by skepticism.
ISSN:2210-5700
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191318