Can the Self Survive the Death of its Mind?
C. A. Campbell has written: Almost everyone takes it to be in principle intelligible to ask whether the self can survive the destruction of its body. But it is taken by no one to be in principle intelligible to ask whether the self can survive the destruction of its mind.' But is it, after al...
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[1969]
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| Dans: |
Religious studies
Année: 1969, Volume: 5, Numéro: 1, Pages: 85-97 |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | C. A. Campbell has written: Almost everyone
takes it to be in principle intelligible to ask whether the self can survive the destruction of its body. But it is taken by no one to be in principle intelligible to ask whether the self can survive the destruction of its mind.' But is it, after all, so clearly nonsense to suppose that a self can survive the destruction of its mind? This at least is the question I shall raise in this paper. The word can' in my title should thus be understood in its purely logical sense. For the question, really, is whether or not one can intelligibly speak of a self's surviving the destruction of its mind. By the term self' I refer to that which is supremely unique in what one calls oneself'; to that aspect or element, in other words, which most decisively distinguishes one self-conscious individual from other such individuals. Now the self thus regarded as the source of one's uniqueness on the one hand, and the self conceived of as the source of one's inner unity on the other, would seem to be but two sides of a single coin. For whatever helps to account for an individual's being identical with itself through internal diversity—or for its being a single individual—must also help, and help in an equal degree, to account for its not being identical with any other individual—or for its being a particular individual; and the converse of this seems equally evident. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Référence: | Kritik in "Selves and Minds (1970)"
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| Contient: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412500003991 |