The Missing Premise in the Ontological Argument

It appears to me that most traditional criticism of the Ontological argument misses the mark because the proponents imply a premise which, if true, would validate their argument on precisely the point attacked by the opponents. In view of this possibility, I propose the following analysis:(1) state...

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Auteur principal: Geisler, Norman L. 1932-2019 (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Cambridge Univ. Press [1973]
Dans: Religious studies
Année: 1973, Volume: 9, Numéro: 3, Pages: 289-296
Accès en ligne: Volltext (Resolving-System)
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Résumé:It appears to me that most traditional criticism of the Ontological argument misses the mark because the proponents imply a premise which, if true, would validate their argument on precisely the point attacked by the opponents. In view of this possibility, I propose the following analysis:(1) state the traditional ontological argument without the implied premise;(2) state the traditional criticisms, showing how they miss the mark;(3) restate the ontological argument with the implied premise made clear;(4) offer a defence of the implied premise;(5) show how the ontological argument is still invalidated by another criticism;(6) argue that the only way to avoid this other criticism is to borrow another premise from the cosmological argument, and(7) that when these premises are borrowed the result is a valid form of the cosmological argument for the existence of a necessary being.
ISSN:1469-901X
Contient:Enthalten in: Religious studies
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1017/S003441250000679X