The Missing Premise in the Ontological Argument
It appears to me that most traditional criticism of the Ontological argument misses the mark because the proponents imply a premise which, if true, would validate their argument on precisely the point attacked by the opponents. In view of this possibility, I propose the following analysis:(1) state...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[1973]
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Dans: |
Religious studies
Année: 1973, Volume: 9, Numéro: 3, Pages: 289-296 |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
Résumé: | It appears to me that most traditional criticism of the Ontological argument misses the mark because the proponents imply a premise which, if true, would validate their argument on precisely the point attacked by the opponents. In view of this possibility, I propose the following analysis:(1) state the traditional ontological argument without the implied premise;(2) state the traditional criticisms, showing how they miss the mark;(3) restate the ontological argument with the implied premise made clear;(4) offer a defence of the implied premise;(5) show how the ontological argument is still invalidated by another criticism;(6) argue that the only way to avoid this other criticism is to borrow another premise from the cosmological argument, and(7) that when these premises are borrowed the result is a valid form of the cosmological argument for the existence of a necessary being. |
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ISSN: | 1469-901X |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S003441250000679X |