Contra Tooley: divine foreknowledge is possible
Michael Tooley's latest argument against the possibility of divine foreknowledge trades on the idea that, whichever theory of time is true, the ontology of the future—or lack thereof—gives rise to special problems for God's prescience. I argue that Tooley's reasoning is predicated on...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
[2020]
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2020, Volume: 87, Issue: 2, Pages: 165-172 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Omniscience
/ Prescience
/ Time
/ Conception
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RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God |
Further subjects: | B
Explanatory dependence
B Future contingents B Michael Tooley B Divine Foreknowledge B Philosophy of time |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
Summary: | Michael Tooley's latest argument against the possibility of divine foreknowledge trades on the idea that, whichever theory of time is true, the ontology of the future—or lack thereof—gives rise to special problems for God's prescience. I argue that Tooley's reasoning is predicated on two mischaracterizations and conclude that, on at least some theories of time, the possibility of divine foreknowledge appears secure. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-019-09727-w |