Common Sense, Scepticism and Deep Epistemic Disagreements
Considering the persisting disagreement between the common sense philosophers and the sceptics, it seems that they are faced with a deep epistemic disagreement. Taking stock from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, one generally thinks that deep epistemic disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. Hinge...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
[2020]
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| Dans: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2020, Volume: 10, Numéro: 2, Pages: 129-155 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Reid, Thomas 1710-1796, An inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense
/ Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951, Über Gewissheit
/ Scepticisme
/ Théorie de la connaissance
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
hinge epistemology
B public reasons B deep epistemic disagreements B Thomas Reid B Sens commun B Scepticism |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |