Covenants and Commands
Robert Adams’s account of divine command theory argues that moral obligations are idealized versions of everyday social requirements. One type of social requirement is the ordinary demand one person makes of one another. Its idealized version is the perfect command a perfect God makes of those he lo...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2020]
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In: |
Journal of religious ethics
Year: 2020, Volume: 48, Issue: 3, Pages: 498-518 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Adams, Robert Merrihew 1937-2024
/ Virtue ethics
/ Duty
/ Promise
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RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism CH Christianity and Society NCC Social ethics |
Further subjects: | B
Robert Adams
B Divine Command B Promises B Ethical Theory B Covenants |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | Robert Adams’s account of divine command theory argues that moral obligations are idealized versions of everyday social requirements. One type of social requirement is the ordinary demand one person makes of one another. Its idealized version is the perfect command a perfect God makes of those he loves. This paper extends Adams’s account of moral obligation by considering another kind of social requirement: promises. It argues that we can understand a divine covenant as an idealized version of a promise. Promisers take on social requirements to promisees when they make promises. Analogously, God takes on obligations to humans when God makes covenants with them. Divine command theorists might fear that this makes God subject to moral rules not of his own choosing. This paper considers these fears and argues that they are unwarranted. |
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ISSN: | 1467-9795 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/jore.12319 |