Why Did the Machine Work?: A Functional-theistic Interpretation from Computational Functionalism
Computational functionalism assumes a synonymy between abstract functional processes in the central processing unit of a typical digital computer and the human brain, hence the conclusion that an appropriately programmed computer is a mind. Arguably, the point is that neural firings are synonymous w...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Philosophy Documentation Center
[2019]
|
In: |
Philosophy & theology
Year: 2019, Volume: 31, Issue: 1/2, Pages: 79-95 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Computer
/ Turing machine
/ Human being
/ Mind
/ Functionalism (Philosophy)
/ Theism
|
RelBib Classification: | CF Christianity and Science NBC Doctrine of God NBE Anthropology VA Philosophy |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | Computational functionalism assumes a synonymy between abstract functional processes in the central processing unit of a typical digital computer and the human brain, hence the conclusion that an appropriately programmed computer is a mind. Arguably, the point is that neural firings are synonymous with the transfer of electrical currents. Both are accountable and susceptible to a physicalist’s explanation. But, the reason they both worked is ultimately premised upon a causal relationship with nature. However, to understand why nature works raises some problems. Nature is either a self-propelled machine or is propelled by another force. The paper submits that, much as the discourse implies some form of “theism,” the only consistent construal is functional-theism. This, again, raises further problems. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 2153-828X |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Philosophy & theology
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.5840/philtheol2020618128 |