God* does not exist: a novel logical problem of evil

I often tell my students that the only thing that is not controversial in philosophy is that everything else in it is controversial. While this might be a bit of an exaggeration, it does contain a kernel of truth, as many exaggerations do: philosophy is a highly contentious discipline. So it is rema...

Description complète

Enregistré dans:  
Détails bibliographiques
Publié dans:International journal for philosophy of religion
Auteur principal: Monaghan, P. X. (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
Vérifier la disponibilité: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
En cours de chargement...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Publié: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2020
Dans: International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2020, Volume: 88, Numéro: 2, Pages: 181-195
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés:B Mackie, John L. 1917-1981, The miracle of theism / Il male / Logica deontica / Ateismo
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophie de la religion
NBC Dieu
Sujets non-standardisés:B Atheism
B Creation
B Respect
B God*
Accès en ligne: Volltext (Resolving-System)
Description
Résumé:I often tell my students that the only thing that is not controversial in philosophy is that everything else in it is controversial. While this might be a bit of an exaggeration, it does contain a kernel of truth, as many exaggerations do: philosophy is a highly contentious discipline. So it is remarkable the extent to which there is agreement in the philosophy of religion amongst theists, agnostics, and atheists alike that John Mackie’s argument for atheism is either invalid or unsound. As a result, the focus has entirely shifted from the logical problem of evil to the so-called evidential one. But I think that this is a mistake, not necessarily because I think Mackie’s argument is sound, but rather because I reject an assumption made by apparently all parties to the debate, which is that there is only one logical problem of evil. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to defend a deductive argument that God* does not exist. As far as I can tell, the basic idea of this argument is a novel one: while Mackie’s argument (and much of the discussion that occurs in its wake) has a more or less consequentialist framework, mine has a deontological one. The evil of which I will speak is that of our having been thrown into the world.
ISSN:1572-8684
Référence:Kommentar in "Is it wrong for God to create persons? A response to Monaghan (2023)"
Contient:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-019-09738-7