The problem of arbitrary requirements: an abrahamic perspective
Some religious requirements seem genuinely arbitrary in the sense that there seem to be no sufficient explanation of why those requirements with those contents should pertain. This paper aims to understand exactly what it might mean for a religious requirement to be genuinely arbitrary and to discer...
Authors: | ; ; |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
2021
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2021, Volume: 89, Issue: 3, Pages: 221-242 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Judaism
/ Christianity
/ Islam
/ Commandment
/ Arbitrariness
/ Obedience
/ Rationality
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RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism BH Judaism BJ Islam CB Christian life; spirituality FA Theology |
Further subjects: | B
Rationality of religious requirements
B Arbitrary requirements B religious obligations |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | Some religious requirements seem genuinely arbitrary in the sense that there seem to be no sufficient explanation of why those requirements with those contents should pertain. This paper aims to understand exactly what it might mean for a religious requirement to be genuinely arbitrary and to discern whether and how a religious practitioner could ever be rational in obeying such a requirement (even with full knowledge of its arbitrariness). We lay out four accounts of what such arbitrariness could consist in, and show how each account provides a different sort of baseline for understanding how obedience to arbitrary requirements could, in principle, be rational. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-020-09775-7 |