Owning Virtue: The Meno on Virtue, Knowledge, and True Opinion
Abstract At the end of the Meno, Socrates suggests that genuine virtue is knowledge. This is surprising because he has recently concluded that virtue is (mere) true opinion. I show that Socrates’ new position is motivated by two commitments. First, that being virtuous requires being responsible for...
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
2021
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| Dans: |
Phronesis
Année: 2021, Volume: 66, Numéro: 3, Pages: 249-273 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
True Belief
B Virtue B Plato B true opinion B Knowledge |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | Abstract At the end of the Meno, Socrates suggests that genuine virtue is knowledge. This is surprising because he has recently concluded that virtue is (mere) true opinion. I show that Socrates’ new position is motivated by two commitments. First, that being virtuous requires being responsible for the correctness of one’s actions. Second, that only a knower has this kind of ownership of action. An implication of my argument is that, despite his emphasis on virtuous action in the Meno, Socrates endorses an agent-centred ethics. He thinks the epistemic status of the agent is essential to the assessment of her goodness. |
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| ISSN: | 1568-5284 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Phronesis
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15685284-BJA10043 |