Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: Exploring a Glut-Theoretic Account

This essay marks the first steps towards a viable glut-theoretic (contradictory) solution to the longstanding foreknowledge and free will dilemma. Specifically, I offer a solution to the dilemma that accommodates omniscience (foreknowledge) and human freedom (as the ability to do otherwise) in a sim...

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Publié dans:Religions
Auteur principal: DeVito, Michael (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: MDPI 2021
Dans: Religions
Année: 2021, Volume: 12, Numéro: 9
Sujets non-standardisés:B contradictory theology
B Free Will
B gluts
B subclassical logic
B Foreknowledge
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Résumé:This essay marks the first steps towards a viable glut-theoretic (contradictory) solution to the longstanding foreknowledge and free will dilemma. Specifically, I offer a solution to the dilemma that accommodates omniscience (foreknowledge) and human freedom (as the ability to do otherwise) in a simple, flat-footed way. This goal is accomplished via viewing the theological fatalist argument not as a problem, but as a sound argument: omniscience and human free will are contradictory and by dropping to a weaker underlying account of logical consequence, we can embrace them in their full-throated, robust (though contradictory) interpretations. That said, the primary aim of this paper is one of exploration: how does a subclassical solution to the foreknowledge and free will dilemma stack up in comparison to the traditional solutions on offer in the literature. This essay represents the beginning of such an exploration.
ISSN:2077-1444
Contient:Enthalten in: Religions
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.3390/rel12090770