What the Problem with Russell Isn't

Mark Nelson thinks that Bertrand Russell's well-known criticisms of St. Thomas Aquinas turn on Russell's acceptance of a highly implausible epistemic principle (DAM), and that my previous objection to this claim depends upon the attribution to Russell of an even more implausible Insincerit...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Oppy, Graham (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Cambridge University Press 2009
In: New blackfriars
Year: 2009, Volume: 90, Issue: 1030, Pages: 680-686
Further subjects:B Theology
B philosophy of religion
B Nelson
B Russell
B Aquinas
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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Summary:Mark Nelson thinks that Bertrand Russell's well-known criticisms of St. Thomas Aquinas turn on Russell's acceptance of a highly implausible epistemic principle (DAM), and that my previous objection to this claim depends upon the attribution to Russell of an even more implausible Insincerity Objection. While I agree that Russell's criticisms do not turn on the Insincerity Objection, I argue that my previous rejection of the attribution of (DAM) to Russell is well-justified: there is a plausible reading of Russell that requires neither (DAM) nor the Insincerity Objection.
ISSN:1741-2005
Contains:Enthalten in: New blackfriars
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-2005.2009.01299.x