The Starting-Points for Knowledge: Chrysippus on How to Acquire and Fortify Insecure Apprehension

This paper examines some neglected Chrysippean fragments on insecure apprehension (κατάληψις). First, I present Chrysippus’ account of how non-Sages can begin to fortify their insecure apprehension and upgrade it into knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Next, I reconstruct Chrysippus’ explanation of how sophisms...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Shogry, Simon (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2022
In: Phronesis
Year: 2022, Volume: 67, Issue: 1, Pages: 62-98
Further subjects:B cognitive impression
B Stoic epistemology
B Custom
B criterion of truth
B Academic skepticism
B Assent
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