Evil and maximal greatness
By defining God as a maximally great being Plantinga is able to devise an ontological argument which validly infers from the possibility of there being a God that there necessarily is a God. In this article I shall argue that Plantinga’s argument is not only question-begging, as several critics have...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
2022
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2022, Volume: 91, Issue: 2, Pages: 93-109 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Plantinga, Alvin 1932-
/ Ontological proof of God's existence
/ Modality
/ Size
/ Maximum
/ Criticism
/ Evil
/ Vicious circle (Philosophy)
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RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God VA Philosophy |
Further subjects: | B
Modal problem of evil
B Maximal greatness B Modal ontological argument B Plantinga |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | By defining God as a maximally great being Plantinga is able to devise an ontological argument which validly infers from the possibility of there being a God that there necessarily is a God. In this article I shall argue that Plantinga’s argument is not only question-begging, as several critics have complained, but circular in the strongest sense of the term. Based on reflections on the relation between the notions of coherence and possibility, I shall defend two arguments, previously proposed by Tooley (Mind 90:422–427, 1981) and Guleserian (Nous 17:221–238, 1983), against the existence of a maximally great being. The article concludes with some critical remarks on Plantinga’s rationale for conceiving God as such a being. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-021-09810-1 |