Articulating Better, Being Better: Ethical Emancipation and the Sources of Motivation
Contemporary philosophy of moral motivation has much to say about the nature of moral beliefs and truths, but it has less to say about emancipation. By neglecting to discuss the emancipatory aspect of motivation, I argue, moral epistemology is neglecting a topic that should be central. Starting from...
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2022
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Jahr: 2022, Band: 25, Heft: 1, Seiten: 107-122 |
| RelBib Classification: | NBE Anthropologie NCA Ethik VB Logik; philosophische Hermeneutik; philosophische Erkenntnislehre |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Charles Taylor
B Motivation B Moral phenomenology B Emancipation B Metaethics B Normative ethics |
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Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Zusammenfassung: | Contemporary philosophy of moral motivation has much to say about the nature of moral beliefs and truths, but it has less to say about emancipation. By neglecting to discuss the emancipatory aspect of motivation, I argue, moral epistemology is neglecting a topic that should be central. Starting from Charles Taylor’s concern for the status of moral sources, the paper’s main points are (1) that moral motivation has a distinctive emancipatory dimension which has been largely neglected in mainstream debates; (2) that the issue of emancipation can only be adequately conceptualized at the intersection of normative ethics and metaethics; (3) that a full-blooded account of motivation must incorporate a phenomenology of motivational experience, which in turn requires (4) extending the concept of motivation beyond a narrow definition to include such notions as meaning, articulation, identity, and freedom, and (5) criticizing conceptions of motivation that are blind to or take for granted the quality of motivation; and thus (6) providing the resources for a thick conception of motivation that breaks new ground by overcoming the existing boundaries between normative ethics and metaethics. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-021-10233-0 |
