Interpersonal Comparison of Welfare Based on Harsanyi's Equiprobability Model for Moral Value Judgments
In 1953, and extended over the following two decades, John Harsanyi published a theorem suggesting that Bayesian rationality postulates together with interpersonal utility comparisons entail an average utilitarian theory. This article summarizes critique on key assumptions of his account. First, irr...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Peeters
2021
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In: |
Ethical perspectives
Year: 2021, Volume: 28, Issue: 4, Pages: 385-416 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Harsanyi, John C. 1920-2000
/ Benefit
/ Moral judgment
/ Affluence
|
RelBib Classification: | NCE Business ethics TK Recent history |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | In 1953, and extended over the following two decades, John Harsanyi published a theorem suggesting that Bayesian rationality postulates together with interpersonal utility comparisons entail an average utilitarian theory. This article summarizes critique on key assumptions of his account. First, irrational and antisocial preferences entail undesirable consequences. Second, the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is a cardinal theory of utility. Third, rational, self-interested, and impartial parties choose acceptable moral principles. Fourth, the observer assigns an equal probability to all positions in society. Fifth, different observers have uniform extended preferences and no personal preferences. This summary is followed by a discussion of model extensions that aim at making welfare interpersonally comparable. These accounts are either based on Harsanyi’s original process of ‘imaginative empathy’ or a process of ‘deep imaginative empathy’, including a conceptualization based on life years in perfect utility. |
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ISSN: | 1783-1431 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/EP.28.4.3290394 |