Representing the Parent Analogy
I argue that Stephen Wykstra's much discussed Parent Analogy is still helpful in responding to the evidential problem of evil when coupled with so-called positive skeptical theism, despite recent valid criticisms of the analogy. Positive skeptical theism, defended by John DePoe, says that al...
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2021
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Jahr: 2021, Band: 13, Heft: 4, Seiten: 157-174 |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Parent Analogy
B Skeptical Theism B problem of evil B Evidential Argument |
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| Zusammenfassung: | I argue that Stephen Wykstra's much discussed Parent Analogy is still helpful in responding to the evidential problem of evil when coupled with so-called positive skeptical theism, despite recent valid criticisms of the analogy. Positive skeptical theism, defended by John DePoe, says that although we often remain in the dark about the first-order reasons that God allows particular instances of suffering, we can have positive second-order reasons that God would create a world with seemingly gratuitous evils. I further explain positive skeptical theism and then apply it to the Parent Analogy, saying that a plausible second-order reason that God would allow seemingly gratuitous evils is that God, like a good parent, wants a rightly ordered friendship with created beings. Then, because this sort of friendship is significantly disanalogous to human parent-child relationships, I go beyond the analogy and directly argue that friendship with God will involve ignorance of suffering-justifying goods. |
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| Enthält: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.2021.3363 |
