Choosing to believe

This article defends a regulative ethics of voluntary belief. In order to determine the occasion and the scope of such an ethics, the article begins with an examination of the concept of belief in conversation with the view of J. L. Schellenberg. Next, against the dominant position in contemporary e...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Mourad, Ronney (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Nature B. V 2008
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2008, Volume: 63, Issue: 1, Pages: 55-69
Further subjects:B J. L. Schellenberg
B Belief
B Ethics
B Evidentialism
B Doxastic voluntarism
B Self-deception
B Faith
B William Alston
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Parallel Edition:Electronic

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