Leibniz, creation and the best of all possible worlds
Leibniz argued that God would not create a world unless it was the best possible world. I defend Leibniz’s argument. I then consider whether God could refrain from creating if there were no best possible world. I argue that God, on pain of contradiction, could not refrain from creating in such a sit...
1. VerfasserIn: | |
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Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Veröffentlicht: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2007
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Jahr: 2007, Band: 62, Heft: 3, Seiten: 123-133 |
weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Creation
B Best possible world B God |
Online Zugang: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Parallele Ausgabe: | Elektronisch
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Zusammenfassung: | Leibniz argued that God would not create a world unless it was the best possible world. I defend Leibniz’s argument. I then consider whether God could refrain from creating if there were no best possible world. I argue that God, on pain of contradiction, could not refrain from creating in such a situation. I conclude that either this is the best possible world or God is not our creator. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Enthält: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-007-9136-7 |