How is the question ‘Is Existence a Predicate?’ relevant to the ontological argument?
It is often said that the ontological argument fails because it wrongly treats existence as a first-level property or predicate. This has proved a controversial claim, and efforts to evaluate it are complicated by the fact that the words ‘existence is not a property/predicate’ have been used by phil...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
2008
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2008, Volume: 64, Issue: 3, Pages: 117-133 |
Further subjects: | B
Ontological Argument
B Gassendi B Caterus objection B Predicates B God B Existence B Kant |
Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
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520 | |a It is often said that the ontological argument fails because it wrongly treats existence as a first-level property or predicate. This has proved a controversial claim, and efforts to evaluate it are complicated by the fact that the words ‘existence is not a property/predicate’ have been used by philosophers to make at least three different negative claims: (a) one about a first-level phenomenon possessed by objects like horses, stones, you and me; (b) another about the logical form of assertions of existence; and (c) still another about a second-level phenomenon possessed by concepts when they are instantiated. I argue that only the last of these claims, originally voiced by Kant, is both plausible and relevant to the ontological argument. And I try to show that the relevance of the Kantian version comes from its providing the underlying justification for a different, and far less controversial, criticism of the ontological argument. | ||
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