The freedom of Christ and the problem of deliberation
Call the claim, common to many in the Christian intellectual tradition, that Christ, in virtue of his created human intellect, had certain, infallible exhaustive foreknowledge the Foreknowledge Thesis. Now consider what I will call the Conditional: If the Foreknowledge Thesis is true, then Christ’s...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
2014
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2014, Volume: 75, Issue: 3, Pages: 233-247 |
Further subjects: | B
Deliberation
B Christology B Freedom B Foreknowledge |
Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Parallel Edition: | Electronic
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Summary: | Call the claim, common to many in the Christian intellectual tradition, that Christ, in virtue of his created human intellect, had certain, infallible exhaustive foreknowledge the Foreknowledge Thesis. Now consider what I will call the Conditional: If the Foreknowledge Thesis is true, then Christ’s created human will lacked an important sort of freedom that we mere humans have. Insofar as many, perhaps all, of the people who affirm the Foreknowledge Thesis also wish to affirm the robust freedom of Christ’s human will, the truth of the Conditional would be most unwelcome to them. I consider an argument in support of the Conditional from the necessary conditions for deliberation, arguing that the argument fails. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-014-9447-4 |