The problem of evil and the attributes of God

In discussions of the probabilistic argument from evil, some defenders of theism have recently argued that evil has no evidential force against theism. They base their argument on the claim that there is no reason to think that we should be able to discern morally sufficient reasons which God presum...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Keller, James A. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Nature B. V 1989
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 1989, Volume: 26, Issue: 3, Pages: 155-171
Further subjects:B Divine Attribute
B Sufficient Reason
B Evidential Force
B Evil Event
B Probabilistic Argument
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Parallel Edition:Non-electronic

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