The problem of evil and the attributes of God
In discussions of the probabilistic argument from evil, some defenders of theism have recently argued that evil has no evidential force against theism. They base their argument on the claim that there is no reason to think that we should be able to discern morally sufficient reasons which God presum...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
1989
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 1989, Volume: 26, Issue: 3, Pages: 155-171 |
Further subjects: | B
Divine Attribute
B Sufficient Reason B Evidential Force B Evil Event B Probabilistic Argument |
Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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520 | |a In discussions of the probabilistic argument from evil, some defenders of theism have recently argued that evil has no evidential force against theism. They base their argument on the claim that there is no reason to think that we should be able to discern morally sufficient reasons which God presumably has for permitting the evil which occurs. In this paper I try to counter this argument by discussing factors which suggest that we should generally be able to discern why God permits evil events. I close by suggesting that the theist use the evidential force which evil does have as a reason to question her understanding of the divine attributes. | ||
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