Weighing evils: the C. S. Lewis approach

It is often argued that the great quantity of evil in our world makes God’s existence less likely than a lesser quantity would, and this, presumably, because the probability that some evils are gratuitous increases as the overall quantity of evil increases. Often, an additive approach to quantifying...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Authors: Seachris, Joshua (Author) ; Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus 1946- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Published: 2007
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2007, Volume: 62, Issue: 2, Pages: 81-88
Further subjects:B Gratuitous pain
B Evil
B Adding pain
B Suffering
B Quantitative argument
B C. S. Lewis
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Parallel Edition:Non-electronic

MARC

LEADER 00000caa a22000002c 4500
001 1821418476
003 DE-627
005 20250325024851.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 221110s2007 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10.1007/s11153-007-9133-x  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)1821418476 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1821418476 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 0  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Seachris, Joshua  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Weighing evils: the C. S. Lewis approach 
264 1 |c 2007 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a It is often argued that the great quantity of evil in our world makes God’s existence less likely than a lesser quantity would, and this, presumably, because the probability that some evils are gratuitous increases as the overall quantity of evil increases. Often, an additive approach to quantifying evil is employed in such arguments. In this paper, we examine C. S. Lewis’ objection to the additive approach, arguing that although he is correct to reject this approach, there is a sense in which he underestimates the quantity of pain. However, the quantity of pain in that sense does not significantly increase the probability that some pain is gratuitous. Therefore, the quantitative argument likely fails. 
650 4 |a Suffering 
650 4 |a Quantitative argument 
650 4 |a Gratuitous pain 
650 4 |a Evil 
650 4 |a C. S. Lewis 
650 4 |a Adding pain 
700 1 |8 1\p  |e VerfasserIn  |0 (DE-588)13053630X  |0 (DE-627)502960426  |0 (DE-576)16761410X  |4 aut  |a Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus  |d 1946- 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t International journal for philosophy of religion  |d Dordrecht : Springer Nature B.V, 1970  |g 62(2007), 2, Seite 81-88  |h Online-Ressource  |w (DE-627)320442098  |w (DE-600)2005049-5  |w (DE-576)103746927  |x 1572-8684  |7 nnas 
773 1 8 |g volume:62  |g year:2007  |g number:2  |g pages:81-88 
776 |i Erscheint auch als  |n Druckausgabe  |w (DE-627)1646760425  |k Non-Electronic 
856 |3 Volltext  |u http://www.jstor.org/stable/27646231  |x JSTOR 
856 |u https://philpapers.org/archive/SEAWET-2.pdf  |x unpaywall  |z Vermutlich kostenfreier Zugang  |h repository [deprecated] 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-007-9133-x  |x Resolving-System  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext  |7 1 
883 |8 1\p  |a cgwrk  |d 20250301  |q DE-101  |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 
935 |a mteo 
951 |a AR 
ELC |a 1 
ITA |a 1  |t 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 4208222484 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 1821418476 
LOK |0 005 20221110052731 
LOK |0 008 221110||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 035   |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2022-09-28#AA391456408E1478263E7AF726E4BA4BE038870F 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-Tue135  |c DE-627  |d DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 866   |x JSTOR#http://www.jstor.org/stable/27646231 
LOK |0 935   |a ixzs  |a ixrk  |a zota 
LOK |0 939   |a 10-11-22  |b l01 
OAS |a 1 
ORI |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw 
REL |a 1 
SUB |a REL