Collins’ core fine-tuning argument

Collins (The Blackwell companion to natural theology, 2009) presents an argument he calls the ‘core fine-tuning argument’. In this paper, I show that Collins’ argument is flawed in at least two ways. First, the structure, depending on likelihoods, fails to establish anything about the posterior prob...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Saward, Mark Douglas (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Nature B. V 2014
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2014, Volume: 76, Issue: 2, Pages: 209-222
Further subjects:B Design
B God
B Fine-tuning argument
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Summary:Collins (The Blackwell companion to natural theology, 2009) presents an argument he calls the ‘core fine-tuning argument’. In this paper, I show that Collins’ argument is flawed in at least two ways. First, the structure, depending on likelihoods, fails to establish anything about the posterior probability of God’s existence given fine-tuning. As an argument for God’s existence, this is a serious failing. Second, his analysis of what is appropriately restricted background knowledge, combined with the credences of a specially chosen ‘alien’, do not allow him to establish the premise \( \Pr (LPU \mid NSU~ \& ~k') \ll 1\).
ISSN:1572-8684
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-014-9453-6