The skeptic, the content externalist, and the theist

Some philosophers argue that content externalism can provide the foundations of an argument against the traditional epistemological skeptic. I maintain that if such an argument is available, it seems there is also an a priori argument against the possibility of a creationist god. My suspicion is tha...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Howell, Robert (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2011
Dans: International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2011, Volume: 69, Numéro: 3, Pages: 173-180
Sujets non-standardisés:B Theism
B Content externalism
B Epistemological skepticism
B Philosophy of mind
B philosophy of language
Accès en ligne: Volltext (JSTOR)
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Édition parallèle:Électronique
Description
Résumé:Some philosophers argue that content externalism can provide the foundations of an argument against the traditional epistemological skeptic. I maintain that if such an argument is available, it seems there is also an a priori argument against the possibility of a creationist god. My suspicion is that such a strong consequence is not desirable for the content-externalists, and that the availability of this argument therefore casts doubt on the anti-skeptical position. I argue that all content externalists should be troubled by this result, since even those philosophers who do not endorse the anti-skeptical strategy must either reject the possibility of a creationist god or admit that their thesis does not hold a priori for minds in general.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contient:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-010-9261-6