No explanation of persons, no explanation of resurrection: on Lynne Baker’s constitution view and the resurrection of human persons
I don’t think Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view can account for personal identity problems of a synchronic or diachronic nature. As such, it cannot accommodate the Christian’s claim of eschatological bodily resurrection-a principle reason for which she gives this account. In light of this, I pr...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
2014
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2014, Volume: 76, Issue: 3, Pages: 297-317 |
Further subjects: | B
Bodily resurrection
B Lynne Baker B Material constitution B Personal Identity |
Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |