Source incompatibilism and the foreknowledge dilemma

The problem that divine foreknowledge poses for free will is one that is notoriously difficult to solve. If God believes in advance how an agent will act, this fact about the past eradicates all alternatives for the actor, given the infallibility of God’s beliefs. And if we assume, with many theists...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Talsma, Tina (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Nature B. V 2013
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2013, Volume: 73, Issue: 3, Pages: 209-219
Further subjects:B Free Will
B Incompatibilism
B Sourcehood
B Foreknowledge
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Parallel Edition:Electronic

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520 |a The problem that divine foreknowledge poses for free will is one that is notoriously difficult to solve. If God believes in advance how an agent will act, this fact about the past eradicates all alternatives for the actor, given the infallibility of God’s beliefs. And if we assume, with many theists, that free will requires alternatives possibilities, then it looks as if God’s omniscience is incompatible with our free will. One solution to this problem, introduced and defended by David Hunt, draws on the source incompatibilist position in the secular free debate. According to source incompatibilists, free will does not require alternative possibilities but is also not compatible with causal determinism. Hunt argues that because God’s foreknowledge does not eliminate future alternatives through causal means, it is compatible with free will. In this paper, I challenge Hunt’s position using Kevin Timpe’s distinction between “wide” and “narrow” source incompatibilists. I argue that if one wishes to be an incompatibilist concerning free will and causal determinism, one must accept that alternatives are required for free will. And if one must accept that alternatives are a necessary condition for free will, then Hunt’s solution to the foreknowledge dilemma will not succeed. 
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