The ontomystical argument revisited

I argue that Alexander Pruss’s ontomystical arguments should not be endorsed without further argumentative support of their premises. My specific targets are his claims that (i) Śamkara’s principle is true and (ii) the high mystics had phenomenal experiences of radical dependence and as of a maximal...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Byerly, T. Ryan (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Springer Nature B. V 2010
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2010, Volume: 67, Issue: 2, Pages: 95-105
Further subjects:B Ontological Argument
B Śamkara’s principle
B Ontomystical argument
B Phenomenal experiences
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Parallel Edition:Electronic

MARC

LEADER 00000naa a22000002 4500
001 1821424980
003 DE-627
005 20221110052752.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 221110s2010 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10.1007/s11153-009-9219-8  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)1821424980 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1821424980 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 0  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Byerly, T. Ryan  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
245 1 4 |a The ontomystical argument revisited 
264 1 |c 2010 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a I argue that Alexander Pruss’s ontomystical arguments should not be endorsed without further argumentative support of their premises. My specific targets are his claims that (i) Śamkara’s principle is true and (ii) the high mystics had phenomenal experiences of radical dependence and as of a maximally great being. Against (i), I urge a host of counterexamples. The only ways I can see for Pruss to respond to these counterexamples end up falsifying (ii). The key problem which leads to this conclusion is that Pruss needs a criterion for distinguishing phenomenal experiences from non-phenomenal experiences according to which the experiences of the high mystics were phenomenal experiences while the experiences of those persons I discuss in my counterexamples to Śamkara’s principle are not. There appears to be no such criterion. I suggest that the future of the ontomystical arguments lies in developing them as inductive rather than deductive arguments. 
601 |a Argumentation 
650 4 |a Ontological Argument 
650 4 |a Ontomystical argument 
650 4 |a Phenomenal experiences 
650 4 |a Śamkara’s principle 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t International journal for philosophy of religion  |d Dordrecht : Springer Nature B.V, 1970  |g 67(2010), 2, Seite 95-105  |h Online-Ressource  |w (DE-627)320442098  |w (DE-600)2005049-5  |w (DE-576)103746927  |x 1572-8684  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:67  |g year:2010  |g number:2  |g pages:95-105 
776 |i Erscheint auch als  |n elektronische Ausgabe  |w (DE-627)1646895940  |k Electronic 
856 |3 Volltext  |u http://www.jstor.org/stable/25652864  |x JSTOR 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-009-9219-8  |x Resolving-System  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext 
935 |a mteo 
951 |a AR 
ELC |a 1 
ITA |a 1  |t 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 4208228997 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 1821424980 
LOK |0 005 20221110052752 
LOK |0 008 221110||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 035   |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2022-09-28#233A8DD29A53D4E6DDCD10C90E2DA1D400E9E61A 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-Tue135  |c DE-627  |d DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 866   |x JSTOR#http://www.jstor.org/stable/25652864 
LOK |0 935   |a ixzs  |a ixrk  |a zota 
ORI |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw 
REL |a 1 
SUB |a REL