Ratio Practica and The Intellectualistic Fallacy

The epistemology of ethics in both philosophical and theological quarters is broadly guilty of what can be called the intellectualistic fallacy. This fallacy ignores the animating affective mold of moral knowing and so wreaks reductionism on ethical epistemology and method. Specifically, the neglect...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Maguire, Daniel C. 1931- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Wiley-Blackwell 1982
In: Journal of religious ethics
Year: 1982, Volume: 10, Issue: 1, Pages: 22-39
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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