An Examination of a Moral Argument against Nuclear Deterrence
After some preliminaries ("I") I examine the merits of an argument which is sometimes used in an attempt to show that nuclear deterrence is morally unacceptable ("II-V"). This is the argument that deterrence is wrong because it involves a threat to do something which it is wrong...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
1985
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In: |
Journal of religious ethics
Year: 1985, Volume: 13, Issue: 2, Pages: 279-297 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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Summary: | After some preliminaries ("I") I examine the merits of an argument which is sometimes used in an attempt to show that nuclear deterrence is morally unacceptable ("II-V"). This is the argument that deterrence is wrong because it involves a threat to do something which it is wrong to do. My conclusion is that there is something to this argument, that it is sufficient to establish a "prima facie" case against nuclear deterrence, but that it is not sufficient to establish a conclusive case against nuclear deterrence. |
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ISSN: | 1467-9795 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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