Divine Command Theories and Human Analogies
Some writers employ human analogies in their attempts to defend a "divine command theory" of the foundation of morals. I argue that this strategy is self-defeating. Appeal to human analogies has implications which tend to undermine any interesting or full-bodied version of divine command t...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
1986
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In: |
Journal of religious ethics
Year: 1986, Volume: 14, Issue: 1, Pages: 216-223 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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Summary: | Some writers employ human analogies in their attempts to defend a "divine command theory" of the foundation of morals. I argue that this strategy is self-defeating. Appeal to human analogies has implications which tend to undermine any interesting or full-bodied version of divine command theory. Indeed, this line of discussion suggests there is a logical confusion in the very idea that some agent-even God-might bring about obligations by an act of will. |
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ISSN: | 1467-9795 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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