The Uniqueness of Persons
Persons are thought to have a special kind of value, often called “dignity,” which, according to Kant, makes them both infinitely valuable and irreplaceably valuable. The author aims to identify what makes a person a person in a way that can explain both aspects of dignity. She considers five defini...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2001
|
In: |
Journal of religious ethics
Year: 2001, Volume: 29, Issue: 3, Pages: 401-423 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
|
MARC
LEADER | 00000naa a22000002 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | 1822384508 | ||
003 | DE-627 | ||
005 | 20221115052624.0 | ||
007 | cr uuu---uuuuu | ||
008 | 221115s2001 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c | ||
024 | 7 | |a 10.1111/0384-9694.00090 |2 doi | |
035 | |a (DE-627)1822384508 | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)KXP1822384508 | ||
040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rda | ||
041 | |a eng | ||
084 | |a 0 |2 ssgn | ||
100 | 1 | |a Zagzebski, Linda |e VerfasserIn |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 4 | |a The Uniqueness of Persons |
264 | 1 | |c 2001 | |
336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |a Computermedien |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |a Online-Ressource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
520 | |a Persons are thought to have a special kind of value, often called “dignity,” which, according to Kant, makes them both infinitely valuable and irreplaceably valuable. The author aims to identify what makes a person a person in a way that can explain both aspects of dignity. She considers five definitions of “person”: (1) an individual substance of a rational nature (Boethius), (2) a self-conscious being (Locke), (3) a being with the capacity to act for ends (Kant), (4) a being with the capacity to act for another (Kant), and (5) an incommunicably unique subject (Wojtyla). She argues that none is capable of grounding both aspects of dignity since they are incompatible kinds of value; it is impossible for the same thing to ground both. Human persons are infinitely valuable in virtue of shareable qualities of their nature, whereas they are irreplaceably valuable because of a nonqualitative feature of their personhood. | ||
773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t Journal of religious ethics |d Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1973 |g 29(2001), 3, Seite 401-423 |h Online-Ressource |w (DE-627)320450171 |w (DE-600)2005952-8 |w (DE-576)090888812 |x 1467-9795 |7 nnns |
773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:29 |g year:2001 |g number:3 |g pages:401-423 |
776 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druckausgabe |w (DE-627)1642690430 |k Non-Electronic | ||
856 | |3 Volltext |u http://www.jstor.org/stable/40015297 |x JSTOR | ||
856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1111/0384-9694.00090 |x Resolving-System |z lizenzpflichtig |3 Volltext |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0384-9694.00090 |x Verlag |z lizenzpflichtig |3 Volltext |
935 | |a mteo | ||
951 | |a AR | ||
ELC | |a 1 | ||
ITA | |a 1 |t 1 | ||
LOK | |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 | ||
LOK | |0 001 4211027883 | ||
LOK | |0 003 DE-627 | ||
LOK | |0 004 1822384508 | ||
LOK | |0 005 20221115052624 | ||
LOK | |0 008 221115||||||||||||||||ger||||||| | ||
LOK | |0 035 |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2022-11-03#014FCD24068A31985E044DD6693C38A953D68B8A | ||
LOK | |0 040 |a DE-Tue135 |c DE-627 |d DE-Tue135 | ||
LOK | |0 092 |o n | ||
LOK | |0 852 |a DE-Tue135 | ||
LOK | |0 852 1 |9 00 | ||
LOK | |0 866 |x JSTOR#http://www.jstor.org/stable/40015297 | ||
LOK | |0 935 |a ixzs |a ixrk |a zota | ||
ORI | |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw | ||
REL | |a 1 | ||
SUB | |a REL |