TRANSCENDENTAL GUILT: On an Emotional Condition of Moral Experience
This article considers a central ethically relevant interpersonal emotion, guilt. It is argued that guilt, as an irreducible moral category, has a constitutive role to play in our ways of conceptualizing our relations to other people. Without experiencing guilt, or being able to do so, we would not...
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
2007
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| Dans: |
Journal of religious ethics
Année: 2007, Volume: 35, Numéro: 1, Pages: 87-111 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Remorse
B Evil B Raimond Gaita B Fyodor Dostoevsky B transcendental philosophy B Guilt B Emotions |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Édition parallèle: | Non-électronique
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