KILLING, SELF-DEFENSE, AND BAD LUCK
This essay argues on behalf of a hybrid theory for an ethics of self-defense understood as the Forfeiture-Partiality Theory. The theory weds the idea that a malicious attacker forfeits the right to life to the idea that we are permitted to prefer one's life to another's in cases of involun...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2009
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In: |
Journal of religious ethics
Year: 2009, Volume: 37, Issue: 1, Pages: 131-158 |
Further subjects: | B
Self-defense
B Luck B Innocence B objectively unjust threat B Partiality B forfeiture |
Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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Summary: | This essay argues on behalf of a hybrid theory for an ethics of self-defense understood as the Forfeiture-Partiality Theory. The theory weds the idea that a malicious attacker forfeits the right to life to the idea that we are permitted to prefer one's life to another's in cases of involuntary harm or threat. The theory is meant to capture our intuitions both about instances in which we can draw a moral asymmetry between attacker and victim and cases in which we cannot. I develop the theory by attending to instances of intentional, villainous harm and instances of involuntary danger—the latter of which are a matter of bad luck. I call some bad luck cases “Interpersonal Lottery Conflicts.” These cases refer to potentially lethal conflicts into which parties are thrown as victims of circumstance. Although neither party has a moral advantage over another, that fact does not preclude permissible self-defense. |
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ISSN: | 1467-9795 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9795.2008.00369.x |