Evil Prevention Requirements and the God of Theism
The central argument of James Sterba’s “Is a Good God Logically Possible?” relies crucially on the notion that a good God would have to abide by various evil prevention requirements. Because it appears that God has not done so, Sterba concludes that God does not exist. I challenge the notion that th...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
MDPI
2022
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In: |
Religions
Year: 2022, Volume: 13, Issue: 12 |
Further subjects: | B
Morality
B Evil B Theodicy B Skeptical theism B God B Defense |
Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Summary: | The central argument of James Sterba’s “Is a Good God Logically Possible?” relies crucially on the notion that a good God would have to abide by various evil prevention requirements. Because it appears that God has not done so, Sterba concludes that God does not exist. I challenge the notion that theists must accept the notion that God is bound by the particular set of evil prevention requirements Sterba’s argument presupposes. However, I argue that investigating ways God may in fact be required to prevent evils may serve as a helpful heuristic for theists as they seek further to understand God’s nature and purposes. |
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ISSN: | 2077-1444 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Religions
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.3390/rel13121164 |