The Value of Faith as a Justification for the Protection of Religious Freedom: a Critique of a New Fideistic Account
Commentators on religious freedom disagree on the rationale for its protection. This question of why we protect religious freedom is important because it influences the manner and scope of the protection of religious freedom by the state. The legal philosopher Timothy Macklem argues, in line with so...
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Routledge
2010
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In: |
Religion, state & society
Year: 2010, Volume: 38, Issue: 2, Pages: 169-179 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | Commentators on religious freedom disagree on the rationale for its protection. This question of why we protect religious freedom is important because it influences the manner and scope of the protection of religious freedom by the state. The legal philosopher Timothy Macklem argues, in line with some fideistic approaches to the study of religion, that the value of ‘faith’- of belief without reason to believe - justifies the protection of religious freedom. This paper offers a critique of Macklem's account. It argues that this account is inconsistent with a correct view of the nature of reasons, that it overestimates the circumstances in which faith is valuable, that it fails adequately to consider the connections between faith and false beliefs, and that its conclusions imply a much weaker protection of religious freedom than is common in liberal states. This paper also indicates aspects of faith that are valuable, beyond those discussed by Macklem. It is hoped that it will contribute to the debate on the value of faith as well as the broader debate on the justification of religious freedom. |
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ISSN: | 1465-3974 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Religion, state & society
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/09637491003726687 |