Middle Knowledge and the Grounding Objection: A Modal Realist Solution
This article aims to provide a defense of the coherence of the doctrine of middle knowledge against the Grounding Objection. A solution to the Grounding Objection is provided by utilising the metaphysical thesis of Modal Realism proposed by David K. Lewis (as further developed by Kris McDaniel and...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
2022
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| Dans: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2022, Volume: 14, Numéro: 4, Pages: 1-41 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Omniscience
B Modal Realism B Possible Words B Middle Knowledge |
| Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | This article aims to provide a defense of the coherence of the doctrine of middle knowledge against the Grounding Objection. A solution to the Grounding Objection is provided by utilising the metaphysical thesis of Modal Realism proposed by David K. Lewis (as further developed by Kris McDaniel and Philip Bricker). Utilising this metaphysical thesis will enable the Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom, that are part of God's middle knowledge, to have pre-volitional truthmakers, and thus, ultimately, we will have a means to finally deal with this problematic issue that has often been raised against this doctrine. |
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| Contient: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.2021.3801 |