Reasoning One’s Way Back into Skepticism

Susanna Rinard aims to show that it is possible to rationally persuade an external world skeptic to reject external world skepticism. She offers an argument meant to convince a skeptic who accepts her views on “several orthogonal issues in epistemology” to give up their external world skepticism. Wh...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Satta, Mark (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2023
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2023, Volume: 13, Issue: 3, Pages: 202-224
Further subjects:B external world skepticism
B Rationality
B doxastic dilemmas
B suspension of judgment
B Susanna Rinard
B Truth
B skeptical invariantism
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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520 |a Susanna Rinard aims to show that it is possible to rationally persuade an external world skeptic to reject external world skepticism. She offers an argument meant to convince a skeptic who accepts her views on “several orthogonal issues in epistemology” to give up their external world skepticism. While I agree with Rinard that it is possible to reason with a skeptic, I argue that Rinard overlooks a variety of good epistemic grounds a skeptic could appeal to in rejecting her argument and its conclusion. More specifically, I argue that the external world skeptic can resist Rinard’s conclusion by (1) distinguishing between skepticism about knowledge and skepticism about justification, (2) by prioritizing obtaining accurate beliefs (maximizing true beliefs and minimizing false beliefs) over being rational, or (3) by treating suspension of judgment as the default rational doxastic attitude. 
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