Simulations, Skepticisms, and Transcendental Arguments
In a previous article, I developed transcendental arguments to refute several versions of Nick Bostrom’s simulation hypothesis. I called some of these arguments the sim-style argument. In this article, I have four main aims. First, I employ the sim-style argument to remedy a defect in Hilary Putnam’...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Brill
2024
|
In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2024, Volume: 14, Issue: 2, Pages: 123-153 |
Further subjects: | B
Transcendental Argument
B Kantian skepticism B brain-in-a-vat argument B Simulation B sim-style argument B brain-in-a-vat scenario |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | In a previous article, I developed transcendental arguments to refute several versions of Nick Bostrom’s simulation hypothesis. I called some of these arguments the sim-style argument. In this article, I have four main aims. First, I employ the sim-style argument to remedy a defect in Hilary Putnam’s brain-in-vat argument. Second, I show that the most radical skepticism, which Tim Button called the nightmarish Cartesian skepticism, can be refuted by the sim-style argument or by another transcendental argument I develop here. Third, I compare my approach to radical skepticisms with Donald Davidson’s, as it is often regarded as an exemplar of transcendental arguments. Fourth, I explain how the prominent objections, mainly developed by Barry Stroud, to transcendental arguments can incur two undesirable results: psychologism and Kantian skepticism. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10065 |