Freeing the Will from Neurophilosophy: Voluntary Action in Thomas Aquinas and Libet-Style Experiments

This essay presents a substantive Thomist response to neurophilosophy’s main experimental challenge to free will: the Libet-style experiments on the neural antecedents of conscious voluntary actions. My response to this challenge will disclose that Thomists are rationally justified in rejecting both...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: De Haan, Daniel D. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: MDPI 2024
In: Religions
Year: 2024, Volume: 15, Issue: 6
Further subjects:B neurophilosophy
B Free Will
B Voluntary Action
B Neuroscience
B Thomism
B Alasdair MacIntyre
B Human Action
B Benjamin Libet
B Thomas Aquinas
B Aristotelianism
B Philosophical Anthropology
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