MORAL REALISM AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS: ANALYSING THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICAL NORMATIVITY IN THEISTIC TRADITIONS
The aim of research is to determine moral Realism and religious Beliefs. Regardless of whether moral truths correspond to moral facts or characterise moral qualities, Peripatetics and moral constructivists, on the other hand, believe that moral truths are discovered via an analysis of the circumstan...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
2024
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2024, Volume: 16, Issue: 2, Pages: 255-269 |
| Further subjects: | B
Ethical Normativity (EN)
B Theistic Traditions (TT) B Moral Realism (MR) B Religious Beliefs (RB) B Foundations (F) |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | The aim of research is to determine moral Realism and religious Beliefs. Regardless of whether moral truths correspond to moral facts or characterise moral qualities, Peripatetics and moral constructivists, on the other hand, believe that moral truths are discovered via an analysis of the circumstances of practical reasoning and human interests. Moral constructivism's perspective on the existence of moral characteristics is similar to Mullā Ṣadrā's on the Platonic Form of the Good. Because he believed that universal conceptions should be reflected in the intellectual domain, Mullā Ṣadrā recognised the reality of the Platonic Forms. The research also determines the analysis of the foundations of ethical normativity in theistic traditions. However, the researcher did not think an appeal to the Forms could be utilised to overcome epistemological concerns concerning natural sorts. Similarly, constructivists and peripatetics might acknowledge a basic account of realism for moral facts and attributes while rejecting the idea that moral knowledge can be obtained by appealing to direct intuitions. Understanding human nature and using common sense are the foundations of moral knowledge that is not dependent on revelation. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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