On the incoherence of molinism: incompatibility of middle knowledge with divine immutability

We argue that there is an incompatibility between the two basic principles of Molinism, i.e., God’s middle knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, and divine immutability. To this end, firstly, we set out the difference between strong and weak immutability: according to the latter only G...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Authors: Sebt, Farid al-Din (Author) ; Azadegan, Ebrahim (Author) ; Esfahani, Mahdi ca. 2. Hälfte des 20. Jh. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Springer Nature B. V 2024
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2024, Volume: 96, Issue: 1, Pages: 23-34
Further subjects:B Divine immutability
B Molinism
B Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom
B Incoherency
B Divine Will
B Middle Knowledge
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Description
Summary:We argue that there is an incompatibility between the two basic principles of Molinism, i.e., God’s middle knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, and divine immutability. To this end, firstly, we set out the difference between strong and weak immutability: according to the latter only God’s essential attributes remain unchanged, while the former affirms that God cannot change in any way. Our next step is to argue that Molinism ascribes strong immutability to God. However, according to Molinism, some counterfactuals of freedom need to be actualized by divine will. We argue that this claim does entail a change in God because it attributes a knowledge to God that involves moving from possibility to actuality through divine will. Therefore, claiming God knows counterfactuals of freedom leads us to reject the strong sense of divine immutability. Further, we argue that assuming God’s knowledge encompasses counterfactuals of freedom cannot be consistent even with weak immutability because, according to Molinism, a change in God’s knowledge requires a change in His essence. We conclude that Molinism is incoherent.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-024-09906-4